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Abstract 
Recently, critical incidents have occurred in complex IT systems. Thus, how to confirm the dependability of a system via 
dependability cases is becoming necessary. Information related to dependability is important knowledge that must be shared 
among stakeholders. However, in previous methods used to describe dependability cases, the relation between a 
dependability claim and responsibility cannot be clearly specified. Thus, since the cause investigation cannot be completed 
at the time of the incident, system knowledge could not fully be utilized. Hence, we propose a method to express a 
responsibility attribute for sharing information and attaining an agreement between stakeholders.  
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1. Introduction 
Recently, critical incidents have occurred in complex IT systems. The assurance of dependability in IT 
systems is becoming increasingly important and should be considered during system implementation. The 
information related to dependability is important knowledge that must be shared among stakeholders. Therefore, 
the use of dependability cases is attracting attention as a method of sharing between stakeholders and a 
confirmation of system dependability. However, in previous dependability cases that describe methods 
represented by goal structuring notation (GSN), the relation between the dependability claim and the 
responsibility cannot be clearly specified. Thus, since the cause investigation cannot be completed at the time 
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of the incident, the system knowledge could not fully be utilized. Hence, we propose a method to express a 
responsibility attribute for sharing information to attain an agreement between stakeholders. Here the 
responsibility attribute specifies who takes responsibility of the dependability case. In this study, we propose a 
concept for incorporating a responsibility attribute into dependability cases. By incorporating responsibility 
attribute, accountability of the dependability case by humans can be achieved. For introducing responsibility 
attributes, we considered d* as the target method. The d* method is one of numerous methods for creating 
dependability cases. After considering the concept, we indicate a simple notation for it. 
In Chapter 1, we describe the introduction. In Chapter 2, we describe the background of the research. In 
Chapter 3, we describe the dependability case. In Chapter 4, we describe the responsibility attribute 
incorporated into dependability cases. In Chapter 5, we discuss our findings, and in Chapter 6, we summarize 
our conclusions. 
2. Research background 
A dependability case is needed to satisfy the high requirement of critical systems. The notation of 
dependability cases and methods to create dependability cases have been proposed and researched. There are 
several methods for notating dependability cases: GSN [1], modular GSN [2-3], D-Case [4], and d* [5]. In [1], 
Kelly also proposed the following six procedures for creating GSNs: (1) identify goals to be supported; (2) 
define bases on which goals are stated; (3) identify a strategy to support goal; (4) define bases on which the 
strategy is stated; (5) elaborate the strategy (and therefore proceed to identify new goals—i.e., go back to (1); 
and (6) identify a basic solution. A method to create a dependability case by using deviation analysis has also 
been proposed [7]; further, a method to create a dependability case by using scenarios has also been proposed 
[2]. 
In requirement engineering, responsibility-related research is growing. In KAOS [8-9], a method to describe 
the responsibility relation between an agent and goal was proposed. Sommerville et al. defined responsibility as 
follows (and proposed an elicitation method of requirement using a responsibility model [10]): “A duty, held by 
some agent, to achieve, maintain or avoid some given state, subject to conformance with organizational, social 
and cultural norms.” Currently, research that explicitly combines responsibility and a dependability case is 
minimal. Therefore, in this study, we propose a concept for explicitly introducing a responsibility attribute for 
d*, which is the notation for dependability cases. 
3. Dependability case 
Recently, safety cases, assurance cases, and dependability cases have been attracting significant attention 
[11-14]. They are prepared to ensure the safety of the given system. In particular, “dependability cases” are 
documents that are prepared to describe the dependability of a system. Dependability is defined as an integrated 
concept that encompasses availability, reliability, safety, integrity, and maintainability [15]. By creating a 
dependability case, the following can be realized: 
x Arrangement of dependability information for ease of understanding 
x Confirmation of system dependability 
x Building consensus among stakeholders regarding system dependability 
x Accountability for system behavior 
In many cases, GSN is used to describe the dependability case. GSN was proposed as a graphical notation 
for safety cases [1]. After that, it was extended to be used as a notation for dependability cases [14]. Currently, 
there are other notations for dependability cases in addition to GSN. Modular GSN is a notation for 
modularized dependability cases [2]. Using modular GSN, you can create and arrange dependability cases by 
using modulus. The d* method incorporates the concept of actors into the dependability case [5]. 
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3.1. The d* method 
The d* method is a graphical notation for describing a dependability case; it was proposed to incorporate the 
actor concept into dependability cases. Here actors are defined as having dependability attributes, such as goals, 
strategies, solutions, and contexts. This idea is considered with reference to i* [16], a method for requirement 
engineering, and it was proposed by our group. 
3.1.1. Notation for d* 
The d* method has a graphical notation that consists of five element types that are described using defined 
characteristic shapes in dependability cases. These shapes are shown in Fig. 1(a). Each element type is 
described below: 
x Actor is the element type that constitutes a system. It has dependability attributes, such as goals, strategies, 
solutions, and context. 
x Goal is the element type that an actor should satisfy. It may be decomposed into subgoals or substrategies. 
x Strategy explains why elements are decomposed into subelements. A goal or strategy can be the object of 
decomposition and may be decomposed into subgoals or substrategies. 
x Solution shows evidence that the supporting goal is satisfied. It is shown in various ways (e.g., 
specifications, test reports, procedure manuals). 
x Context is the external information that is required for goals and strategies. For example, you can consider a 
procedure list that is the goals target as context. 
These elements are related to each other in a dependability case such that d* has four types of relationships. 
These are described in Fig. 1(b). The four types of relationships are explained below: 
 
 
Fig. 1. (a) elements of d*; (b) relationships of d* 
x The “supported by” relationship shows that an upper element is supported by one or more lower elements. 
Goals and strategies can be upper elements, whereas goals, strategies, and solutions can be lower elements. 
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x The “in context of” relationship shows the addition of a context to goals and strategies. 
x The “depend on” relationship shows that one actor depends on another actor. When there is a “depend on” 
relationship between actors A and B, there is generally a “supported by” relationship between the elements 
of A and the elements of B. 
x The “belong to” relationship shows that goals, strategies, contexts, and solutions belong to a given actor. 
3.1.2. Creation procedure for d* 
The creation procedure for d* was proposed in [6]. It consists of four procedures. In this method, by 
repeatedly using these procedures, the dependability case is gradually created. Figure 2 shows the four 
procedures, which are explained below: 
 
 
Fig. 2. procedure of the d* method 
x Actor elicitation: In this procedure, actors in the system are elicited. In the early stage of dependability case 
creation, they are elicited using the IT system configuration diagram and other documentation. 
x Dependability elicitation: In this procedure, dependability information between actors is elicited as inter-
dependability information. This relationship will become a “depend on” relationship. 
x Inter analysis: In this procedure, the inter-dependability information of actors is analyzed by GSN. This 
information has been elicited in the dependability elicitation procedure. A subgoal should be elicited from 
the results of the analysis. Also, the following question is answered: which actor will the new goal depend 
on? If there is not an adequate actor, one must proceed with the actor elicitation procedure for eliciting an 
adequate actor. 
x Inner analysis: In this procedure, the inner dependability of actors is analyzed by GSN. 
The “depend on” relationship is based on the “supported by” relationship. Therefore, for existing “depend 
on” relationships, “supported by” relationships must be added accordingly; however, there are situations in 
which “supported by” relationships have not been considered yet, although corresponding “depend on” 
relationships are allowed. Namely, it is allowed to consider “depend on” relationships before “supported by” 
relationships.  
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4. Introduction of a responsibility attribute in dependability cases 
4.1. Responsibility attribute 
In order for a dependability case to have meaning, it is necessary that each element of the dependability case 
actually be satisfied. That is, someone must take responsibility for each element of the dependability case. 
More specifically, humans or organizations must take responsibility for each element of the dependability case. 
The introduction of a responsibility attribute has been carried out by various methods. Lamsweerde proposed 
an agent model in a requirement engineering method [8-9], which includes the concept of responsibility. 
Sommerville et al. proposed a responsibility model for eliciting information requirements and socio–technical 
risk [10,17-18]. Feltus et al. proposed a responsibility model for verifying organizational structure and 
detecting policy problems [19]. Boness et al. proposed a responsibility model for appraising the intention of a 
development [20]. Strens et al. proposed a responsibility model for identifying and specifying requirements 
[21]. Responsibility attribute concepts are listed in Table 1. 
Table 1. Comparison of proposed responsibility attributes 
Proposer Purpose Main Elements 
Lamsweerde Show the distribution of responsibilities within 
the system and define system scope and 
configuration 
Goal, 
Agent, 
Operation, 
Object 
Sommerville Explore the structure and dependability of 
socio–technical systems 
Responsibility,  
Resource, 
Agent, 
Feltus Verify the organizational structure and detect 
policy problems 
Organization,  
Responsibility,  
User (Agent),  
Task, 
Boness Appraise the intention of a development Goal,  
Actor (Agent) 
Strens Identify and specify requirements Responsibility, 
Resource, 
Agent 
Although there is a marginal difference between these concepts, five proposals resemble each other. We 
discovered that these concepts have a basic pattern of responsibility relationships. That is, there are 
relationships in which an agent takes responsibility for an object. There are two main concepts that are included 
in a responsibility relationship: (1) an agent and (2) a responsibility object. A responsibility object was 
expressed as a responsibility or a goal element in the models. Therefore, when we consider the incorporation of 
a responsibility concept into d*, we felt that two key elements (responsibility and agent) had to be considered. 
Some of the proposals could use agent as a non-human system. However, we define an agent as a human or an 
organization of humans, because non-human systems cannot take responsibility in a human society. 
4.2. Responsibility attribute in d* 
In this study, we consider the introduction of responsibility attributes into d*. The d* method is one of 
numerous methods for describing dependability cases. In d*, actor elements are explicitly considered. Here 
actors are elements of a system and become a dependability subject. A human, an organization, a mechanical 
system, an IT system, etc. can become an actor in a dependability case of d*. When considering responsibility 
attributes in d*, it is necessary to consider that non-human objects cannot take responsibilities. More 
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specifically, mechanical and IT systems cannot take responsibility themselves.Therefore, the introduction of 
the agent concept is necessary to consider responsibility in d*. We added agent elements and the “responsible 
for” relationship into d*, which are defined as follows: 
x An agent takes responsibility for elements of a dependability case in d*. That is, an agent must have 
accountability for the contents of elements. A human or an organization consisting of humans can become 
an agent for actor responsibilities. Further, it is acceptable for the same object to become an actor and an 
agent simultaneously in d*. 
x The “responsible for” relationship shows that elements other than an agent take responsibility held by an 
agent. 
With an actor and other elements, the cardinality of the relationship “responded by” differs. Actors and 
agents have a many-to-many relationship, as shown in Fig. 3(a). More specifically, it is possible that one agent 
supports multiple actors, or multiple agents support one actor. When viewed from the perspective of the actor, 
this relationship can be considered by the following two cases: 
x Case (1): One agent supports the actor. In this case, the agent must take responsibility of all elements of the 
actor. 
x Case (2): Multiple agents support the actor. In this case, each agent must support each of the elements of the 
actor. 
Relationships between other elements (i.e., goals, strategies, solutions and contexts) and agents will be 
many-to-one. The responsibility of an element must be supported by only one agent. On the other hand, an 
agent may support multiple elements. This relationship is shown in Fig. 3(b). 
 
 
Fig. 3. cardinality between (a) actor and agent; and (b) other elements and agent 
4.3. Notation of the responsibility attribute in d* 
We adopted a new simple graphical notation for the responsibility attribute in d*. As an alternative, it was 
possible to extend the format of statements that explain the elements in a dependability case. The d* method 
originally had graphical notation for dependability cases. We felt it natural that the same graphical notation be 
adopted. We decided to use a shape enclosed by a dashed line to describe a responsibility attribute. Examples 
using this new notation are shown in Figs. 4 and 5 and are described below. 
A portion of a dependability case using this new notation is shown in Fig. 4. In the figure, some actor’s 
responsibilities are supported by a single agent. For example, “Cage” is such an actor. This corresponds to case 
(1) above. More specifically, the dependability elements of “Cage” are supported by a “development section.” 
On the other hand, some actor’s responsibilities are supported by multiple agents. For example, “Rope” is such 
an actor. This corresponds to case (2). More specifically, the dependability elements of “Rope” are supported 
by “maintenance section” and “wire company.” In this case, two shapes are overlapped at the actor in the graph. 
Another example that describes inner of actor is shown in Fig. 5. Elements of actor are divided and 
associated with an appropriate agent that has a responsibility for it. All elements of actor must be supported by 
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the appropriate agent. If there is an element that is not supported by any agent, its dependability case is not 
complete, and the model would be thought of as being at the middle phase of development. 
 
 
 Fig. 4. dependability case example that shows inter dependability between actors. 
5. Discussions 
5.1. Use of responsibility attributes 
One of the purposes of a dependability case is system accountability. To ensure satisfactory accountability 
for the dependability case, the responsibility of elements of the dependability case should be shared among 
stakeholders. In previous dependability cases, sharing data was limited to goals, strategies, contexts, and 
solutions. As shown in this study, a responsibility attribute can be shared among stakeholders by introducing 
responsibility attributes into dependability cases. Therefore, we extended the dependability case concept to 
incorporate a responsibility attribute for knowledge sharing among stakeholders. 
5.2. Organizations and dependability cases 
Generally, agents belong to an organization that has a layered structure. In such an organizational structure, 
responsibility and authority are transferred from upper to lower layers. A dependability case also has a layered 
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structure. In dependability cases, the layered structure is modeled via “supported by” relationships between 
upper and lower goals. That is, an upper goal is supported by one or more lower goals. Relationships of two 
elements in the layered structure are divided into two types—i.e., hierarchical order or no hierarchical order. 
When two agents of an organization have a hierarchical order, the corresponding elements of the dependability 
case also have a hierarchical order. 
In general, it is better if two hierarchical orders are combined. For example, consider a case in which agent 
A takes responsibility for goal A, agent B takes responsibility for goal B, and goal B is supported by goal A. 
We feel that it is better if agents A and B are the same or if agent A is at a lower layer than agent B. If the 
hierarchical order is different between the organizational structure and dependability case, a responsibility may 
be present in the structure of the dependability case, but not in the organizational structure. In such a case, 
additional action may be required. Checking dependability cases against an organizational structure can 
identify unsuitable transfers of authority. 
 
 
Fig. 5. dependability case example that shows inner dependability of actors (Rope). 
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5.3. Actor and agent concepts 
The concept of an agent resembles the concept of an actor. More specifically, these may indicate the same 
object, but we stress that their concepts must be clearly distinguished. When we think of a responsibility 
attribute, the concepts of agent and actor are different. An actor can become an agent when an actor is a human 
or an organization of humans, since a human can take responsibility. Conversely, when an actor is not a human 
or an organization of humans, the actor cannot become an agent, because the actor cannot take responsibility. 
For example, IT or physical systems can become actors in a dependability case, but they cannot take 
responsibility. Therefore, they cannot become agents in a dependability case. Instead, a human that can take 
responsibility must be an agent. Also, while an actor is a human, the responsibility of an actor might be 
supported by other humans. In such a case, actors and agents are different humans. In general, we felt that in 
human society, humans must take responsibility. We must consider supporting responsibility by humans in 
dependability cases. Only humans or organizations of humans can satisfy accountability in dependability cases. 
5.4. Notation of responsibility of d* 
In this study, we adopted a graphical notation for describing a responsibility attribute in dependability cases 
by using d*. Other notations can also be considered for describing responsibility attributes in dependability 
cases. For example, the methods below can also be considered: 
x Extend a statement format of an element to show responsibility 
x Use an external table to indicate the relationship between element and responsibility 
In the future, it is necessary to evaluate a suitable method while considering the purpose of the dependability 
case. 
5.5. Extending the creation procedure for responsibility attributes 
In this study, we created a dependability case example that introduced a responsibility attribute by using an 
existing dependability case. We were not creating the dependability case example that has responsibility 
attributes from the beginning. We appended the responsibility attributes to dependability case that did not have 
responsibility attributes. Therefore, we did not consider the procedure for introducing responsibility attributes 
into a dependability case. Nonetheless, we can conclude the following: (1) it is necessary to prepare the 
procedure of eliciting an agent; and (2) it is better to add an agent to a dependability case after dependability 
analysis (i.e., inter analysis and inner analysis). After creating a dependability case, the procedure that checks 
by comparing the organizational and dependability case-layered structures may be also needed. 
6. Conclusion 
In this study, we proposed a concept for incorporating responsibility attributes into a dependability case 
described by d*. We also proposed a simple notation for it. In previous dependability cases, sharing data of 
attributes was limited to goals, strategies, contexts, and solutions. We added the responsibility attribute. 
Therefore, the whereabouts of accountability in a dependability case can be clearly shown. In introducing the 
responsibility attribute, we investigated previous research that relates to responsibility models. We found that 
responsibility attributes consist of two type elements—i.e., an agent and a responsibility object. We used the 
agent concept in dependability cases to introduce responsibility attributes. 
In the future, we plan to improve the concept and corresponding notation through experiments in describing 
dependability cases. Considering procedures for creating dependability cases that have responsibility attributes 
will also be future studies. 
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